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Lessons	from	the	1890s	to	realign	innovation	and
finance	in	post-Brexit	Britain
There	is	increasing	consensus	among	political	and	economic	commentators	that	the	UK	economy	is	in	significant
need	of	rebalancing.	The	gulf	between	the	finance-based	London	economy	and	former	manufacturing	regions	was
thrown	into	sharp	relief	by	the	Brexit	vote,	reinforcing	the	momentum	for	the	so-called	“Northern	Powerhouse”	and
“Midlands	Engine”	initiatives	and,	to	underpin	a	new	focus	on	regional	policy	hubs,	the	suggested	devolution	of	some
financial	functions	of	the	Bank	of	England	to	cities	like	Birmingham.
Our	recently	published	research	on	the	cycle	and	pneumatic	tyre	industry	reveals	some	of	the	historical	origins	of
imbalance	in	the	British	economy	and	offers	perspectives	on	the	current	policy	focus	aimed	at	its	correction.
In	the	late	1880s	and	early	1890s,	this	new	manufacturing	industry,	centred	on	Birmingham	and	other	cities	of	the
English	Midlands,	including	Coventry	and	Nottingham,	came	to	prominence	on	a	wave	of	innovation:	First	for
pneumatic	tyres	and	cycles,	and	later	for	automobiles	and	interchangeable,	but	patentable,	cycle	components.
A	rush	for	stock	market	listings	followed,	based	more	on	the	earnings	potential	of	these	new	patents	than	the	value
of	established	manufacturing	facilities,	which	were	often	little	more	than	small	workshops.	As	such,	cycle	firms	were
risky	challenges	for	investors	and	offered	fertile	ground	for	unscrupulous	and,	on	occasion,	fraudulent	company
promoters.
A	boom	followed,	culminating	in	the	spring	of	1896	with	the	large	Dunlop	float.	“Bicycle	mania”	featured	high	profile
fraud	cases,	most	famously	involving	the	company	promoter	Ernest	Terah	Hooley,	which	attracted	national
newspaper	headlines.	Hooley’s	methods	featured	“guinea	pig”	directors,	several	of	whom	were	famous	aristocrats,
and	so	called	for	taking	fees	in	guineas	for	providing	nothing	in	return,	famously	parodied	by	Gilbert	and	Sullivan	in
The	Gondoliers.
These	“lords	on	the	board”	were	thus	implicated	in	an	apparently	serious	misallocation	of	financial	resources,	in	a
boom	that	collapsed	as	quickly	as	it	developed.	As	the	major	financial	centre,	London	could	now	add	a	further	reason
for	avoiding	industrial	finance	in	the	manufacturing	regions	in	favour	of	its	emerging	preferences	for	overseas
investments.
Although	the	shunning	of	investment	opportunities	in	the	regions	was	clearly	an	important	consequence,	our
research	reveals	that	promotions	using	aristocratic	directors	were	a	conscious	strategy	to	overcome	already	existing
barriers	to	accessing	London	finance.	Elite	directors	offered	access	to	a	social	network,	which	in	turn	offered	the
access	to	the	financial	resources	needed	to	underpin	the	development	of	this	important	new	industrial	sector.
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Our	analysis	of	73	cycle	and	tyre	firms	showed	that	aristocratic	representation	on	the	board	was	the	overwhelmingly
important	determinant	of	firms	having	London	listings;	more	important	than	patents	controlled,	product	type,	financial
instruments	used,	or	location	of	head	office.
In	parallel	with	the	“trust	movement”,	which	created	dominant	firms	in	some	industries	in	the	United	States	and	in
Britain	in	the	1890s,	the	objective	of	these	promotions	was	to	establish	patent-based	monopolies	centred	on	groups
of	firms	connected	by	elite	interlocks	at	board	level.	A	leading	example	was	the	British	Motor	Syndicate	(BMS),	a
group	of	connected	companies	promoted	by	Henry	Lawson	that	also	drew	together	an	impressive	network	from	all
corners	of	the	British	establishment.
Aristocratic	and	other	elite	directors	did	more	than	simply	collect	fees.	They	enlisted	supporters,	as	in	the	BMS,
ranging	from	road	lobby,	like	the	promoters	of	the	famous	London	to	Brighton	rally	of	1896,	the	“emancipation	run”
which	ended	the	“red	flag”	based	4	m.p.h.	speed	limit	on	motor	vehicles,	to	cycle	touring	organisations	and	product
endorsing	celebrities	like	the	famous	cricketer,	Prince	Ranjitsinhji.
Less	glamorous	firms,	preferring	to	list	only	on	regional	stock	markets,	most	commonly	in	Birmingham	or	Nottingham,
were	typically	devoid	of	aristocratic	or	elite	directors.	A	leading	case	was	the	Raleigh	cycle	company,	which,	following
preferences	of	local	investors,	shunned	the	London	market	in	favour	of	financial	independence	under	the	leadership
of	Frank	Bowden,	with	shares	quoted	only	in	Birmingham.
Reliance	on	local	pools	of	capital	worked	well	for	new	firms	as	long	as	cities	like	Birmingham	enjoyed	some
prominence.	The	Chamberlain	family,	including	most	notably	in	the	1890s,	Joseph	Chamberlain,	dominated	politics
in	Birmingham	and	nationally,	and	were	also	significant	investors	in	the	cycle	industry.
Regional	stock	exchanges	could	easily	cater	for	the	financial	needs	of	modest	sized	industrial	firms.	However,	their
relatively	thin	pools	of	capital	became	an	important	constraint	as	the	scale	requirement	of	firms	increased	–	a
problem	exacerbated	by	their	overdependence	on	regional	sectors	vulnerable	to	structural	decline	after	1920.
These	constraints	continue	to	operate	today.	The	challenge	to	policy	makers	seeking	to	rebalance	the	British
economy	is	to	create	clusters	of	innovation	in	the	regions	with	access	to	suitable	growth	finance.
The	bicycle	industry	was	sustained	by	such	local	alignments	for	several	decades,	whereas	the	boom	and	bust	of
1896	was	very	much	a	London	phenomenon.	The	key	questions	for	today	therefore	are:	Should	economic
rebalancing	involve	the	encouragement	of	regional	middle	tier	financial	institutions,	or	should	London	and	the
financial	elite	once	again	attempt	to	engage	with	networks	of	industry	and	innovation?
The	answers	from	the	bicycle	boom	are	that	the	former	solution	offers	low	transaction	cost,	bespoke	partnerships,
whereas	the	latter	provides	access	to	deeper	financial	resources,	albeit	at	higher	cost.	Regional	policy,	in	the	gap	left
by	Brexit,	faces	a	challenge	posed	by	this	dilemma,	but	also	an	opportunity	to	strike	the	right	balance.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	Accessing	capital	markets:	Aristocrats	and	new	share	issues	in
the	British	bicycle	boom	of	the	1890s.	Business	History,	VOL.	60,	No.	2,	231–256.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
Featured	image	credit:	London	to	Brighton	veteran	car	run,	by	Le	Miroir	des	sports,	22	novembre	1927,	p.380,
Public	Domain.
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